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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err when it failed to recognize the 16th Section line as the Section 12 
boundary, and allowed extrinsic evidence to determine the boundary line? 
2. If the trial court did not err, does sufficient evidence support the trial court's findings as 
to the Section 12 boundary? 
3. Does sufficient evidence support the trial court's determination that no public right-of-
way exists along the sixteenth line of the Section 12 Property? 
4. Does sufficient evidence support the trial court's determination that a county road did 
not exist along the western boundary of the Section 18 Property thereby precluding 
Roller's traditional access to his property from the south? 
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to continue the trial so that Don 
Anderson could testify regarding the county road along the west edge of the Section 18 
property? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The interpretation of a deed, if it is unambiguous, is a question of law. Gillmor v. 
Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995). Questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994). 
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The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 
Gillmore v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995); Hancock v. Planned 
Development Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990). The trial court's findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous if they are not supported by sufficient evidence. Gillmore, 904 P.2d at 706. 
Finally, a district court's refusal to continue a trial is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 298 (Utah App. 1994); see 
Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b). "[I]n determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this 
court must review the reasonableness of the trial court's decision, and should not disturb the 
decision unless it was "clearly unreasonable and arbitrary." Id. at 299 (internal citations 
omitted) (quoting Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290, 293 (Utah 
1964)). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105 
Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 45(h) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
INTRODUCTION 
Roller and Godfrey own adjoining dryland farms in northwest Cache County, Utah. 
These farms cover property that includes quite mountainous terrain. These farms are accessed 
through various county roads, public rights-of-way and private easements, very few of which 
are paved or maintained in great detail. 
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Koller bought the relevant property in 1967 from Lillie Thompson. One section (the 
"Section 12 Property") comprises the southeast quarter of Section 12, Township 14 North, 
Range 2 West. Roughly, Godfrey owns the north half of the southeast quarter of Section 12, 
Koller owns the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12 and a third party, Glen 
Thompson, owns the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12. 
In the northwest corner of the southeast quarter of the Koller Section 12 Property is a 
metal watering trough (in the shape of a very large barrel, cut in half lengthwise) that was used 
to water horses and cattle since the land was first homesteaded in the late 1800's. 
Since the settling of the Section 12 Property, the adjacent property owners and any 
members of the public could access that trough along a public right-of-way that travels 
east/west along the border between the Thompson property on the south and the Godfrey 
property on the north (the "Section 12 Right-of-Way"). For illustrative purposes only, a 
diagram of the property is attached as Attachment "l".1 The Section 12 Right-of-Way has 
never been abandoned. To the contrary, subsequent deeds of the various adjacent properties 
acknowledged and attempted to preserve it. 
Furthermore, as illustrated on the drawing in Attachment " 1 " , Koller owns the 
northwest quarter of Section 18, Township 14 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. Godfrey owns the southwest quarter of Section 18. Together, these properties 
constitute the Section 18 Property. Below Section 18 is Section 19. A county road (7200 
West) runs north/south along the west edge of Section 19 by a residence owned by Don 
Anderson. Mr. Anderson's residence is located in the southwest corner of Section 19 
1
 In fact, this diagram was used by the court for illustrative purposes. (Record at 386—10-11). 
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(illustrated by three small squares in Attachment "1"). Since at least 1946, that county road 
(the "Section 18 County Access Road") continued north along the west edge of the Section 19 
Property and along the west side of the southwest quarter of the Section 18 Property. The 
county road ended at the midpoint line that divides the north and south halves of the Section 18 
Property. 
At various times since 1967, Koller accessed his Section 18 and adjoining property by 
way of this county road to haul out the wheat he farmed on his property. In some instances, 
given the nature of the terrain and the little to no formal maintenance of the county road, 
runoff water would flood the road and make it impassable. When the water drained, however, 
Koller once again used the county road. 
The public, including Mr. Koller, enjoyed unobstructed access along both the Section 
12 Right-of-Way and the Section 18 County Access Road until the late 1980's, when Godfrey 
attempted to obstruct access along both properties and change the Section 12 Property line. 
This lawsuit followed. At trial, the district court ruled that the evidence did not support either 
a Section 12 Right-of-Way or the Section 18 County Access Road. Further, the district court 
changed the Section 12 boundary line so that it did not conform to the sixteenth line which 
divides the Godfrey property on the north from the Koller and Thompson property on the 
south. 
Koller, through his trial counsel, filed a motion for a new trial based on additional 
evidence located after the trial of the matter. This motion sought to introduce language 
describing the Section 18 County Access Road which was located after trial in the microfiche 
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archives of the unpublished Utah Supreme Court decisions. The language from the decision 
reads as follows: 
appellants filed an answer claiming a prescriptive right to travel along a roadway he 
averred was an established road which left his land where it adjoined respondents' 
eastern boundary and then crossed respondents' land in a general southwesterly 
direction to the southwest corner thereof where it entered a county highway extending 
in a northerly and southerly direction along the west side of respondents' property 
[Section 18 Property]. 
Roller's motion for a new trial was denied, and this appeal follows. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Section 12 Boundary Line and Right-of-Wav 
1. In 1897, Mary Jardine acquired the north half of the Section 12 Property from 
the United States government. The description of the property was prorated, meaning that it 
granted to Ms. Jardine literally the north half of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (Trial 
Record at 386—229, hereafter "Record"). 
2. In 1918, the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12 was 
transferred to the Godfreys, but not using a prorated description. Instead, it was transferred 
using a metes and bounds description. (Record at 386—225-30). 
3. Specifically, the transfer of the northwest quarter was done in the following 
manner: 
Beginning 80 rods north and 80 rods west of the southeast corner of the 
southeast quarter of Section 12, Township 14 North, Range 2 West of the Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian running thence west 80 rods, thence north 80 rods, thence east 80 
rods, thence south 80 rods. 
(Record at 386-225-226). 
4. The deeded description places the southern boundary of the Godfrey property 23 
feet from the original boundary identified in the prorated deed. It places the boundary of the 
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Godfrey property 23 feet north of the 16 section line, the line that divides the north half of the 
southeast quarter of Section 12 from the south half of the southeast quarter of Section 12. 
(Record at 386-224-27; PL's Trial Exhibit #1). 
5. In 1935, the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12 was 
transferred to Elmer Bingham. (Record at 386—114, 229-30; Deposition of Glen Thompson, 
dated February 17, 1993 at 6, published at Record at 387—475-76, hereafter "Thompson 
Dep."; PL's Trial Ex. # 103 at 2). Currently, it remains described in a prorated fashion, not 
in a metes and bounds fashion. (Record at 386—230). In fact, all of the properties 
surrounding the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12 have all been 
transferred using prorated descriptions. (Record at 386—230). 
6. In 1945, Kenneth and Peru Thompson, the owners of the southeast quarter of 
the southeast quarter of Section 12, transferred that sub-quarter, using a prorated deed, to 
Wendell Thompson. (PL's Trial Ex. # 102 at 2). The deed also transferred "title and interest 
of grantors to a steel watering trough . . . said watering trough being situated in the Northwest 
corner of the Southeast quarter of said Section 12." (PL's Trial Ex. # 102 at 2). 
7. In addition to identifying the trough inside the southeast quarter of the southeast 
quarter of Section 12, the deed also notes that the grant of interest to the trough was "subject . 
. . to all rights heretofore given to other persons to water stock at said steel watering trough, 
together with necessary rights of ingress and egress thereto." (PL's Trial Ex. # 102 at 2). 
8. Two days before the transfer to Wendell Thompson, Kenneth and Peru 
Thompson granted to Glen W. Thompson access rights to the same steel trough. The language 
reads in relevant part: 
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The right to water livestock consisting principally of work animals at a steel watering 
trough situated in the Northwest corner of the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 12 . . .together with the right of ingress and egress to said steel 
watering trough for the purpose of carrying the right hereby granted into effect, it being 
understood and agreed that this right is not exclusive, but is to be exercised in 
connection with similar rights of other parties and subject to reasonable care to avoid 
unnecessary interference with the rights of other parties to a like service. 
(PL's Trial Ex. #102 at 1). 
9. Also in 1945, Koller purchased the property that includes Sections 7 & 8 of 
Township 14 North, Range 1 West. (See Attachment " 1 " ; Record at 386—112-13). The 
western side of Section 7 is contiguous to the eastern side of Section 12. (Record at 386—113; 
Attachment "1"). 
10. In 1967, Koller purchased the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of 
Section 12 from Wendell Thompson. (Record at 386—107; Attachment "1"). 
11. At the time Koller purchased the property, a road ran from the west side of the 
midline of the southeast quarter of Section 12 to the steel watering trough near the actual center 
of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (See App.'s Ex. #233, see Record at 386—106-107, 
200). The trough was situated north to south, and was put in place in 1924 or 1926. 
(Thompson Dep. at 10). 
12. On the east side of the watering trough, was a grain drill. (Record at 386—106-
107; Ex. 233). 
13. Just north of the northern end of the drill is where the boundary line had 
traditionally been that separates the Godfrey property on the north and the Koller property on 
the south. (Record at 386—105, 117; Ex. 231, 233). It constitutes the dividing line between 
the north and southern halves of the southeast quarter of Section 12 (identified as the 16th line), 
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and is located approximately 10 feet north of a square pipe that has been implanted near the 
northwestern edge of the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (Record at 
386-82, 116-119, 234-35; Ex. 231, 233). 
14. There are remnants of a fence running east/west from the square pipe to a point 
approximately 10 feet west of the southern end of the steel trough, and Godfrey claims his 
property extends south to that fence line. (Record at 386—118-19, 223; Ex. 228, 230-33). 
15. The result, however, is that Godfrey's claimed possession line is located nearly 
10 feet south of the 16th line, and nearly 33 feet south of the line described in his deed's metes 
and bounds description. (Record at 386—238). 
16. Approximately ten feet west of the steel trough was the boundary line that 
separates the Roller property on the east from the Thompson property on the west, thus placing 
the steel trough inside the Roller property, or the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of 
Section 12. (Record at 386—116-17). 
17. A fence ran north/south along the east edge of the southwest quarter of the 
southeast quarter of Section 12 (the Thompson property) and there was a gate in that fence just 
south of the steel trough so that the trough could be accessed from Thompson's property. 
(Thompson Dep. at 21). 
18. The boundary line dividing the Godfrey and Roller properties in Section 12 was 
surveyed by Randy Lamarr Bott and his partner Don Williams, in approximately 1989. Mr. 
Bott was hired by Godfrey to settle the issue of the border between Roller and Godfrey on that 
Section 12 Property. (Record at 386—40, 46). 
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19. The last time Mr. Bott and Mr. Williams went to the property, they met both 
Koller and Godfrey at the "east terminus of the center, of the east/west center line of the 
southeast quarter of Section 12" at a railroad tie that had been implanted there. (Record at 
386—48, 59). The railroad tie had been implanted at the east terminus of the middle of the 
southeast quarter of Section 12, and was agreed upon by both parties as the eastern dividing 
line between the north and south halves of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (Record at 
386-60). 
20. To arrive at the location, Godfrey, Mr. Bott and Mr. Williams drove east from 
7300 West on a "roadway" that divided the Godfrey property on the north and the Thompson 
property on the south. (Record at 386—48-49). The roadway began from 7300 West on the 
west side of the southeast quarter of Section 12 and went easterly until it approached the steel 
watering trough and drill. It ran the length of the border dividing the Godfrey property on the 
north and the Thompson property on the south. (Record at 386—48-49, 71-72, Ex. 233, 227). 
21. On a prior occasion, Mr. Bott and Mr. Williams had tied in their survey 
beginning point with the county survey, which was done by Preston Ward prior to that time. 
As a result, they located the section corner marker for the northeast corner of Section 12 and 
shot the line from that point south to where they were at the railroad tie. They were aided by a 
fairly well established fence that went north/south along the eastern edge of Section 12. 
(Record at 386—56-57). They determined that the railroad tie was not on the actual eastern 
edge of Section 12, but in fact, was west of that line. Nevertheless, they determined that the 
railroad tie was on the east/west line that divided the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter 
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of Section 12 from the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12, and they 
determined that point to be the 16th Corner. (Record at 386—60-61, 73). 
22. Mr. Bott opined that the county corner marker was a reliable marker from 
which to determine the relevant boundary. (Record at 386—76). 
23. Once they tied the county corner marker to the railroad tie, Mr. Williams left 
the others and drove west along that east/west, 16th line into the southwest quarter of section 
12. (Record at 386—62-68). Mr. Williams and Mr. Bott flagged various posts along the 16th 
line using their surveying equipment. (Record at 386—71-72, 116-117; Ex. 227). 
24. Roller and Godfrey were the two to actually drive the posts into the ground. 
Mr. Bott then proceeded to place flags or ribbons on each post. (Record at 386—105-106, 
116-117; Ex. 227, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233). 
25. One post was placed just north of the steel trough, and was later replaced by 
Roller with a large telephone pole. (Record at 386—204-205). Roller placed the telephone 
pole at that location so that it could be identified from the east end of the 16th line, i.e., the 
railroad tie. The rolling hills located on the property made the various points along the 16th 
line impossible to see from one end to the other. (Record at 386—203). 
26. The 16th line went from the railroad tie on the east to just north of the steel 
trough. At the trough point, the line was north of the fence that divided Godfrey and 
Thompson property. In other words, upon arriving just west of the steel trough, along the 16th 
line, a fence appeared to jog to the south about ten feet. (Record at 386—82, 116-117; Record 
at 387—460-61; Thompson Dep. at 9, 16-17; Ex. 231, 233). After jogging south about 10 
feet, the fence then continues to the west until it connects with a square pipe that has been 
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implanted in the ground on the western edge of the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter 
of Section 12. (Record at 386—118-19, 245-46; Record at 387—263, 374; Thompson Dep. at 
9, 55-56; Exhibit "3" of Thompson Dep.). 
27. The line, including the flagged posts, as they were placed west of the steel 
trough, created a boundary line running parallel, approximately 10 feet north of the fence and 
square pipe. (Record at 386-118-19, 223, 245-46; 460-61, 409; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit #1). 
At the time, it was Roller's understanding that the flagged property line constituted the 
boundary between the Koller and Thompson property on the south, and the Godfrey property 
on the north. (Record at 386—68, 119-20, Record at 387—460-61). In fact, Koller had 
farmed his property to that line since purchasing the property in 1967. (Record at 387—426-
27). 
28. Just west of the steel trough was a gate dividing the Thompson property on the 
South from the Godfrey property on the north. This gate was in existence at the time the 
Rollers purchased the Section 7 property in the 1940's and was used by Koller to access his 
property on multiple occasions. (Record at 386—121-23; Record at 387—265, 285). On 
multiple occasions, Koller personally used the Section 12 Right-of-Way to reach a county road 
(7900 West), on the north side of the fence line that lined the north edge of the Thompson 
property. (Record at 386—122-23; Record at 387—456). Furthermore, it was used at various 
times by others to haul grain out of the Koller fields located east of the road. (Record at 386— 
124-26; Record at 387- 265, 285, 423, 455-56). 
29. In fact, since the property was homesteaded, the public, including Ken 
Thompson, Glen Thompson, Sam Whitney and others, used the Section 12 Right-of-Way to 
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access the trough to water their horses and other animals, and to access a log home (originally 
owned and used year round by the Whitneys) that was located just east of southeast corner of 
Section 12. (Record at 386—122-23, 125-26, 140-141; Record at 387— 423, 456; Thompson 
Dep. at 11-12, 27, 36-37; Exhibit " 1 " of Thompson Dep.). 
30. Access along the Section 12 right-of-way was never impeded until 1988 or 
1989, when Godfrey tried to close access. (Record at 387—265, 443; Record at 388—588). 
The Section 18 County Access Road 
31. Also in 1967, Koller purchased the northwest quarter of Section 18, Township 
14 North, Range 1 West. (Record at 386—113-14; Record at 387—445). He purchased this 
property from the estate of Wendell Thompson. (Record at 387—288). The Section 18 
Property is contiguous to the southwest quarter of Roller's Section 7 property. (See 
Attachment "1"). 
32. The southwest quarter of Section 18 was originally owned by Don Anderson, 
until Godfrey purchased it some time in the late 1980's or early 1990's. (Record at 387—289). 
The Koller and Godfrey Section 18 properties are collectively referred to as the "Section 18 
Property." Below Section 18 is Section 19. The southwest quarter of Section 19 is owned by 
Don Anderson, and the southwest corner of the southwest quarter contains his resident 
homestead. (Record at 386—128; Record at 387—274-76; PL's trial exhibit 328; See 
Attachment "1"). 
33. Along the west edge of Section 19 is a county road (7200 West) that runs 
north/south. (Record at 386—129-130). When Koller bought the Section 18 Property in 1967, 
the road (7200 West) continued north from the northwest corner of Section 19, along the west 
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edge of the southwest quarter of Section 18 until it ended at the southwest corner of Roller's 
Section 18 Property (the road is referred to as the "Section 18 County Access Road". (PL's 
Trial Ex. # 328 showing road from north to south down to Anderson residence on the east). It 
was Roller's and others' understanding that the entire section of road was a county road. 
(Record at 386—128-30; Record at 387—291; Record at 388—590). 
34. Aerial photographs taken in 1946, 1959 and 1966 show how the county road, 
7200 West, traveled north along the west side of Section 19 and up to the middle of the west 
edge of Section 18 where it ended at the beginning of the northwest quarter of Section 18 
(Roller's property). (Record at 387-286-87, 289-93; PL's Trial Ex. 10 & 12). 
35. Furthermore, the trial judge noted, but would not receive, a county map which 
showed the same 7200 West road traveling north and ending at the Roller Section 18 Property. 
(Record at 387-330-31). 
36. Roller and others used that road continuously since prior to 1967 for various 
reasons to gain ingress and egress to his portion of the Section 18 Property. It was a wide and 
fairly well-packed road. (Record at 386-132-33, 138-39; Record at 387-265, 281, 283, 285, 
423, 457, 459). 
37. In fact, when Roller purchased both the Section 12 and Section 18 properties, 
there were only two access routes, one along the Section 12 Right-of-Way, and one along the 
Section 18 County Access Road. (Record at 388—588). 
38. Roller alleged at trial that Godfrey suddenly halted all access of ingress and 
egress through both the Section 12 Right-of-Way and the Section 18 County Access Road 
beginning in the late 1980's. This lawsuit was filed on August 11, 1992. 
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MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE 
When appealing a district court's factual determinations, the appellant must first 
marshall all the evidence in favor of the court's findings, and thereafter show why those 
findings are not supported by sufficient evidence. See Slattery v. Covey & Co., 857 P.2d 243, 
246 (Utah App. 1993). As most of the issues addressed below require that Koller marshall the 
evidence, it will be done in the Argument section in the order each applicable issue is 
addressed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The unambiguous deeds to the northeast and southeast quarters of the southeast quarter 
of Section 12 transfer the property in a prorated fashion. They each transfer a quarter piece of 
the southeast quarter of Section 12. As such, the dividing line between the two properties is 
the section line which is identified as the 16th Section line. The trial court should have declared 
the 16th Section line to be the appropriate boundary, without referencing parole evidence. 
However, the trial court erred by looking beyond the unambiguous language of the deeds. 
However, at trial, Godfrey argued that a fence constituted the boundary line. This 
fence allegedly ran from the east terminus of the 16th Section line straight in a southwesterly 
direction to a steel pipe that Godfrey's own surveyor agreed was ten feet south of the 16th line. 
Godfrey never claimed, nor presented evidence, of boundary by acquiescence or boundary by 
agreement. Nevertheless, the trial court erroneously concluded that this "fence" line 
constituted the appropriate boundary. Substantial evidence does not support the trial court's 
decision. 
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In addition, in the northwest corner of the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of 
Section 12 is a large steel watering trough. At trial, KoUer presented evidence that for years, a 
road ran east/west from the steel trough to the western edge of the southeast quarter of Section 
12. This road was used by the public to access the watering trough with animals, as well as to 
access a homestead located southeast of the trough. No one disputed this evidence. Instead, 
Godfrey claimed that the roads had since been closed. 
Utah law recognizes public rights-of-way over roads used by the public for at least ten 
years. This Section 12 Right-of-Way was used by the public for many more than ten years, 
and was never abandoned. Utah law further provides that a public right-of-way continues until 
formally abandoned by the proper authorities. The Section 12 Right-of-Way was never 
abandoned. As a result, it continues to this day regardless of Godfrey's attempt to farm over 
it. The trial court determined that no public right-of-way exists along the Section 12 Right-of-
Way. Substantial evidence does not support the courts finding. 
Finally, Koller presented evidence at trial that a county road exists along the western 
edge of the Section 18 Property. This Section 18 County Access Road, which is a northern 
extension of 7200 West that ends where the Koller Section 18 Property begins, was evidenced 
through aerial photographs, a county map, and testimony by Koller. 
In addition, on the second day of trial, Koller intended to call Don Anderson as a 
witness regarding the Section 18 County Access Road. Neither party subpoenaed Mr. 
Anderson. However, Godfrey listed him as a "will call" witness, and Koller had confirmed 
his attendance by telephone. Also, Godfrey's counsel represented to Roller's trial counsel that 
Godfrey would call Mr. Anderson as a witness. Koller relied on that representation. 
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Mr. Anderson appeared in court to testify. Yet, after waiting in the courthouse for 
some time, during one of the breaks, counsel for Godfrey spoke with Mr. Anderson, and 
thereafter Mr. Anderson left the building. Koller was unable to locate him. 
Koller informed the trial court that Mr. Anderson was a key witness regarding the 
Section 18 County Access Road, but the trial court would not continue the trial so that Mr. 
Anderson could testify. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to do so. 
In summary, the trial court erred in its determination as to the Section 12 Property 
boundary, and substantial evidence does not support the court's factual findings respecting the 
Section 12 Right-of-Way and the Section 18 County Access Road. Furthermore, the trial court 
abused its discretion when it failed to continue the trial so that Mr. Anderson could testify 
regarding the Section 18 County Access Road. The Court should vacate the judgment of the 
trial court and remand the case for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE 
BOUNDARY LINE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE APPLICABLE DEEDS. 
The district court erroneously found that the points marked as ABC on Defendants' 
Exhibit " 1" constituted the boundary line between the Godfrey property on the north and the 
Koller property on the south in the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12. 
(Record at 304). Specifically, the trial court found: 
25. There is a square pipe imbedded in the ground at approximately Point A 
on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1. This square pipe replaced a wooden post in the exact 
same location and the post and pipe in succession have been in the present location of 
the square pipe for more than [sic] eight (80) years last past. 
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26. The square pipe at Point A on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 marks the 
recognized boundary between the Northwest Corner of the Clark Property and the 
Southwest Corner of the Godfrey Section 12 Property. 
* * * 
30. The Court finds that the ABC Fence line marks the historical and 
recognized boundary between the Godfrey Section 12 Property on the North and the 
Koller Section 12 and Clark Property on the South. 
(Record at 304, 305). 
The unambiguous deeds, however, demonstrate that the property line dividing the 
Godfrey and Koller properties in the southeast quarter of Section 12 is the 16th line that 
traveled straight from the railroad tie on the east to the west side of Section 12. This section 
line does not contain a "jog", but rather is a straight line that crosses the middle of the 
southeast quarter of Section 12 and connects with the western edge of the southeast quarter of 
Section 12 approximately 10 feet north of the square pipe that constitutes "Point A" on 
appellees' trial Exhibit No. 1. 
Godfrey never disputed that the Section 12 Property was originally granted by the 
United States government using references to the government's official survey. Koller 
acquired his portion of Section 12 by way of a prorated deed that transferred to him the 
southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (Record at 386—107; PL's Ex. #101, 
1 7). The deed is unambiguous. The north boundary line is the section line that divides the 
north half from the south half of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (PI. 's Trial Ex. #101). 
In addition, the deed granting the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 
12 to Godfrey also uses a prorated deed. (Record at 386—230, PL's Ex. #103 at 2). That 
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deed is also unambiguous. The south boundary line is the section line dividing the north half 
from the south half of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (PL's Trial Ex. #103). 
"If a deed description is unambiguous, its interpretation is a question of law." Gillmor 
v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995). Furthermore, it will be interpreted 
without resorting to extrinsic evidence. Id. 
Applied to the present case, as the unambiguous language of the deeds demonstrates, 
there is no question that the proper boundary between the Godfrey and Koller properties in 
Section 12 is the line dividing the northern from the southern half of the southeast quarter of 
Section 12, i.e. the 16th section line. The trial court erred when it failed to recognize the clear 
deed descriptions as designating the 16th section line as the boundary. 
II. FURTHERMORE, EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR, THE 
EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DETERMINATION OF THE SECTION 12 PROPERTY BOUNDARY LINE. 
A. The Deeds Transferred the Relevant Property in Prorated Fashion. 
At trial, three surveyors testified regarding the location of the 16th section line. Two of 
the three (Wayne Crow and Keith Hansen) testified that the 16th section line traveled west from 
a railroad tie that was located on the east terminus of Section 12 and ended on the west side of 
the southeast quarter of Section 12 approximately ten feet north of a square pipe that was 
imbedded close to the west side of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (Record at 386—234-
35; Record at 387-394). 
The third surveyor, Randy Lamarr Bott, testified that the 16th line went from the 
railroad tie on the east, through the steel trough and to the square pipe on the west. (Record at 
386—96). The problem with Mr. Bott's testimony, however, is that he could not recall much 
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of the events of his own survey. First, he admitted that he surveyed the property nine years 
before trial. He testified as to the events that took place, but only in the abstract. He testified 
that he marked the boundary, but could not recall what items he used to mark it. (Record at 
386-66). 
Second, when shown a photograph of the area, Mr. Bott could not recall with certainty 
any of the area or items shown in the picture. (Record at 386—79-80). Third, the results of 
his survey were never introduced at trial. Instead, he testified wholly from memory. In fact, 
when he was questioned regarding possible discrepancies between the 16th section line and the 
square pipe, he stated: "I can't remember exactly because it didn't seem like that there was a, 
a difference, a conflict in those points." (Record at 386—96). The core of his testimony was 
that he could not really remember. (Record at 386—96-97). 
Both Wayne Crow and Keith Hansen, on the other hand, placed the 16th line within one 
foot of each other and about ten feet north of the square pipe. (Record at 387—394; Record at 
386—245-46). They performed their surveys more recently than did Mr. Bott, they were hired 
one by each of the parties to the case, and at least Mr. Crow's actual survey results were 
admitted into evidence. This evidence, together with the deeds to the Godfrey and Koller 
properties in Section 12, unambiguously establish the dividing boundary at the 16th line. 
The clear weight of the evidence placed that line from the railroad tie on the east to a 
point about ten feet north of the square pipe on the west. The trial court's finding that the 16th 
line went from the railroad tie to the square pipe was clearly erroneous and not based on 
sufficient evidence. Thus, the Court should reverse the trial court's findings as to the 
boundary between the Koller and Godfrey properties in Section 12. 
144729 1 19 
B. Witness Testimony Supports the Survey Results of Mr. Crow and Mr. 
Keith Hansen that the Boundary Line is the 16th Section Line. 
In addition to the deed and survey evidence, Glen Thompson testified (via published 
deposition) that many years ago, a fence began at the railroad tie, traveled west to the west 
side of the steel trough, then jogged south about ten feet, and continued west to the square 
pipe. (Thompson Dep. at 9, 16-17). Koller also testified of the jog in the fence line. (Record 
at 386—116-17). A ten-foot jog to the south in the fence line is inconsistent with a straight 1611^ 
section line. In other words, where the 16th line is a straight line, and to get from the railroad 
tie to the square post historically involved a jog to the south ten feet, the square pipe cannot 
possibly lie in line with the 16th section line. 
Godfrey called three witnesses who testified that there was no "jog" in the fence line, 
but rather that the fence went straight from the railroad tie, over the middle of the steel trough, 
and to the square pipe. (Record at 387—344-45; Record at 388— 490, 526). These witnesses 
were Godfrey himself, his son Lamont, and his brother-in-law Dee Hansen. (Record at 387— 
337; Record at 388—490, 526). This testimony does not establish, however, where the 16th 
line is, but rather the alleged position of a fence, which Godfrey alleges to constitute the 
property line. Even assuming Godfrey's claim that the fence line went straight from the 
railroad tie to the square pipe is true, it does not establish the fence line as the 16th line, and to 
the extent that it does not conform to the 16th line, it cannot constitute the correct boundary. 
Such a finding would place the 16th section line diagonally in a southwesterly direction. 
Instead, the 16th line, as established in the deeds and determined by those qualified to identify 
it, constitutes the correct boundary. 
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C. Godfrey did not Allege Boundary by Acquiescence at Trial, and even if He 
had, the Evidence Presented Fails to Establish the Necessary Elements. 
The trial court found that the fence line constituted the boundary between the Roller 
and Godfrey Section 12 properties, a finding directly contrary to the unambiguous deed 
descriptions. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law further suggest boundary 
by acquiescence in establishing the relevant boundary. (Record at 303-305). However, 
Godfrey never alleged boundary by acquiescence at trial, and furthermore failed to present 
sufficient evidence to establish it. 
First, the trial court merged all pleadings into a final pretrial order. (Record at 225). 
The Pretrial Order makes absolutely no mention of any claim by Godfrey for boundary by 
acquiescence. (See Record at 224-26). More important, Godfrey made no mention of it at 
trial. Second, even if such were properly pleaded, Godfrey did not present sufficient evidence 
to establish that the ABC fence line constitutes a boundary by acquiescence. 
To establish a boundary by acquiescence, Godfrey must show: 
(i) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) 
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a period of at least 20 years, (iv) 
by adjoining landowners. 
Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1996). Godfrey failed to present sufficient 
evidence of boundary by acquiescence. In fact, he did not even attempt to put on evidence of 
any of the four required elements. As a result, the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous 
when it determined the boundary to be located on the ABC line instead of the 16th Section line. 
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D. The Court's Determination of Boundary by Agreement is not Supported by 
Substantial Evidence. 
Finally, the trial court found that Koller and Godfrey "agreed" to the ABC boundary 
line as the boundary between the Godfrey and Koller Section 12 properties. (Record at 305-
306). The evidence does not support such a finding. 
A boundary by agreement, like any other contract, requires consideration. See Staker 
v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423 n.4 (Utah 1990). Here, however, Godfrey did not put on 
any evidence of consideration. Koller consistently claimed that the boundary line was the 16th 
Section line as provided for in the deeds. (Record at 386—105, 117). Thus, no evidence 
supports the trial courts finding that the parties somehow agreed upon the ABC line as the 
appropriate section line. The Court should reverse the trial court's finding in this regard. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT NO PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-
WAY EXISTS ALONG THE SIXTEENTH LINE OF THE SECTION 12 
PROPERTY LACKS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
The trial court found no evidence to support Roller's claim that a public right-of-way 
exists across the southern boarder of the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 
12. (Record at 307). Dee Hansen testified that he cultivated the northwest quarter of the 
southeast quarter of Section 12 down to the fence line that constitutes the AB line on 
Defendants Exhibit #1 from 1964 on. (Record at 387—at 346). Furthermore, he testified that 
he had never seen Koller travel across the Section 12 right-of-way until the lawsuit was filed. 
(Record at 387—349). Dee Hansen further testified that Koller never hauled grain over the 
Section 12 right-of-way. (Record at 387—350). 
Godfrey's son, Burke Lamont Godfrey, also testified that before the lawsuit was filed, 
he never saw Koller use the Section 12 right-of-way. Furthermore, he testified that previous to 
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the lawsuit, there were no tracks whatsoever along the Section 12 right-of-way. (Record at 
388—495-96). A. Burke Godfrey himself also testified that neither Koller, nor anyone before 
him ever traveled across the claimed Section 12 right-of-way. 
However, it was undisputed that since the southeast quarter of the Section 12 property 
was homesteaded, the public accessed the steel trough as well as a homestead originally owned 
by the Whitneys by way of a road along the Section 12 Right-of-Way. (Record at 386—123, 
125-26, 140-41; Record at 387—371-72). In fact, Godfrey admitted that the Section 12 right-
of-way was used when the property was first homesteaded to access the Whitney homestead. 
(Record at 388—555-56). Godfrey and the other witnesses claimed that Koller did not use the 
Section 12 right-of-way, but none of those witnesses disputed the evidence that the Section 12 
right-of-way was used for years and years previously, when the property was first 
homesteaded. 
In fact, Godfrey himself admitted that the Section 12 right-of-way was used before 
Koller owned the property. He then claimed "They're both closed today. They've been 
closed for, for a long time." (Record at 388—556). Dee Hansen also admitted that in years 
past, it was his understanding that people used the right-of-way to water their horses and other 
animals at the steel trough. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 states "A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated 
and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Furthermore, section 72-5-105 states: "All public 
highways once established shall continue to be highways until abandoned or vacated by order 
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of the highway authorities having jurisdiction over any highway, or by other competent 
authority." 
At trial no party disputed that when the Section 12 property was homesteaded, and for 
years afterward, the Whitneys and others used the Section 12 right-of-way to access a log 
home located east of the Section 12 property, and to water their animals at the steel trough. 
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that no right-of-way existed along 
the south boarder of the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12. 
Finally, no evidence was presented to suggest that the public right-of-way was ever 
abandoned by the appropriate authorities. Therefore, it continues to exist until appropriately 
abandoned, regardless of the testimony that Godfrey may have farmed over it. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 72-5-105. Substantial evidence does not support the trial court's finding. 
IV. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
CONCLUSION THAT NO COUNTY ROAD EXISTS ALONG THE WESTERN 
EDGE OF THE WEST SIDE OF THE SECTION 18 PROPERTY. 
Respecting the Section 18 County Access Road, the trial court found: 
39. Prior to the time that Roller acquired the Wendell Thompson Property in 
Section 18 Property, there was evidence of travel along the West boundary of the 
Godfrey Section 18 Property between Points G and E shown on Defendants' Exhibit 1. 
40. Koller acquired the Koller Section 18 Property in 1967. 
41. Godfrey's predecessor in ownership of the Godfrey Section 18 Property 
was Don Anderson (Anderson). 
42. Within two (2) years after Koller acquired the Koller Section 18 
Property, Anderson began cultivating up to the West line of the Godfrey Section 18 
Property and obliterated any evidence of travel across the West boundary of the 
Godfrey Section 18 Property and has cultivated up to that line continuously every year 
until Godfrey acquired the property from Anderson and Godfrey has cultivated up to 
the West line of the Godfrey Section 18 Property each and every year since Godfrey 
acquired the Godfrey Section 18 Property up to the present time. 
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43. Koller has produced no evidence to establish the basis on which evidence 
of travel along the West portion of the Godfrey Section 18 Property occurred or was 
used prior to the time Koller acquired his Section 18 property. There is no evidence 
before the Court that there was any deeded, prescriptive or Cache County right to any 
easement along the G-F line on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 across the Godfrey Section 
18 Property between Points F and G on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1. 
(Record at 307-308). 
A. The Evidence Showed a County Road along the West Edge of Section 18. 
At trial, Burke Lamont Godfrey testified that from 1969 or 1970 to the time of trial, he 
never saw a road along the west side of Section 18. (Record at 388—498). He testified that he 
cultivated the southeast quarter of Section 18 up to the west property line, and that until he had 
a confrontation with Koller, there were no tracks there. (Record at 388—499). 
In addition, A. Burke Godfrey testified at trial that he had owned the southeast quarter 
of Section 18 for the last 4Vi to 6 years, and that he had never seen a roadway across the 
Section 18 property. (Record at 388—539). 
Dee Hansen testified that he owned the southeast quarter of Section 13, which property 
is contiguous (See Attachment "1") to the west side of Section 18, and that he was on the 
property every year for 33 years. (Record at 387—338, 340-41). Dee Hansen also testified 
that there was a road along the west side (which constitutes the FG line on Defendants' Exhibit 
" 1 " [the Section 18 County Access Road]) for one to three years after he purchased the 
property. (Record at 387—353, 367). After that time, the ground was farmed over the road to 
the fence on the west side. (Record at 387—354). 
In sum, none of Godfrey's witnesses stated that there was no county road along the 
west side of Section 18. Instead, they stated that whatever road was there, Godfrey farmed 
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over. Roller himself admitted that he asked Don Anderson to plow up the road in the mid-
eighties in order to control rye that was infesting the surrounding farms. (Record at 387— 
446). Godfrey's evidence does not negate the existence of a county road. 
On the other hand, evidence was introduced to show that a clear roadway existed along 
the Section 18 County Access Road, and that the roadway was in fact a county road. First, 
aerial photographs taken in 1946, 1959, and 1966 show how a county road, 7200 West, 
traveled north along the west side of Section 19 (See Attachment #1) and up to the middle of 
the west edge of Section 18. These photographs show a continuous county road traveling north 
along the west edge of Section 18 and ending at the southwest corner of the northwest quarter 
of Section 18; i.e. the Roller Section 18 property. (Record at 387—286-87, 289-93). 
Second, the trial court acknowledged, but improperly would not receive, a county map 
which showed the same 7200 West road traveling north and ending at the southwest quarter of 
the Section 18 property. (Record at 387—330-31). Roller and others used that road 
continuously since before 1967 for various reasons to gain ingress and egress to the Section 18 
Property. It was a wide and fairly well-packed road. (Record at 386—132-33, 138-39; 
Record at 387- 265, 281, 283, 285, 423, 455, 457, 459). 
Third, Roller testified that it was his understanding that the roadway along Section 18 
was a county road. (Record at 386—129-130; Record at 387—289-93; Record at 388—590). 
Godfrey's counsel objected to Roller's testimony regarding whether or not the road was a 
county road, and the judge originally sustained the objection. However, Roller's testimony 
was not improper. Rule 803(20), Utah Rules of Evidence provides for the admission of 
testimony addressing "Reputation concerning boundaries or general history." The rule states 
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the following not to be "excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as 
a witness": 
Reputation in a community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or 
customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general history 
important to the community or State or nation in which located. 
Utah R. Evid. 803(20). 
No one questioned that Koller had been a resident of the area for many years. He was 
in a position to testify as to the customs and boundaries affecting the Section 18 Property. He 
testified that those in the area understood the road to be a county road, and he described the 
road as having the appearance of a county road. The trial judge improperly excluded his 
testimony regarding the Section 18 County Access Road. 
Koller presented evidence to the trial court that the roadway along the Section 18 
property was a county road. Godfrey did not present contrary evidence, but rather claimed 
that the parties plowed up the road. Such evidence, however, does not negate the fact that a 
county road existed. Farming over a county road does not make the road any less of a county 
road. Utah law clearly requires abandonment of the road by the proper authorities, which 
never took place in this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105. 
B. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion when It Failed to Continue the Trial 
so that Don Anderson Could Testify Regarding the Section 18 County Road. 
At the second day of trial, Koller intended to call Don Anderson as a witness to testify 
that the Section 18 road was a county road. (Record at 387—416-20). At the time, 
Mr. Anderson had been listed as a "will call" witness by Godfrey. However, he had not been 
served with a subpoena from either party. (Record at 387—417-18). Koller had previously 
contacted Mr. Anderson by telephone and asked if he would be present at trial to testify as a 
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witness for Koller, which he agreed to do. Furthermore, trial counsel for Roller had 
previously contacted counsel for Godfrey and had been told by Godfrey's counsel that 
Mr. Anderson would be testifying for Godfrey. (Record at 387—420). Roller's trial counsel 
relied on that representation. (Record at 387—420). 
Mr. Anderson appeared at trial, intending to testify. However, after having a 
conversation with Godfrey's counsel, Mr. Anderson left the courthouse and could not 
thereafter be located. When it came time for him to testify, Koller could not find him. As a 
result, Koller explained the dilemma to the trial court. The court acknowledged Roller's 
problem, but stated that it would stay on schedule with the trial. (Record at 387—416-20). 
"Granting a motion to continue a trial is within the trial court's discretion." Holbrook 
v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 298 (Utah App. 1994); see Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b). 
Thus, "[I]n determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court must review the 
reasonableness of the trial court's decision, and should not disturb the decision unless it was 
"clearly unreasonable and arbitrary." Id. at 299 (quoting Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 15 
Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290, 293 (Utah 1964)) (internal citations omitted). 
Here, it is true that neither party had subpoenaed Mr. Anderson. However, once 
Mr. Anderson was present in the courthouse, a subpoena became unnecessary. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 45(h) ("A person present in court . . . may be required to testify in the same manner as 
if the person were in attendance upon a subpoena."). Godfrey's counsel had represented to 
Roller's trial counsel that Mr. Anderson would be present, and he was, in fact, present for 
some time in the courthouse. Roller relied on that representation, and further relied on the 
presence of Mr. Anderson. 
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Mr. Anderson was a key witness for Koller regarding the existence of a county road 
along the Section 18 property. When the trial court insisted in continuing the trial as 
scheduled, it eliminated crucial evidence from Roller's case. The trial court was unreasonable 
in this regard. The trial should not have closed the evidence and ruled on the case until Koller 
had a reasonable time to locate Mr. Anderson for testimony. Doing so unduly prejudiced 
Roller's case and this prejudice was clear error. 
The trial court noted its concern with its busy docket. (Record at 387—417-18). 
However, it could have continued with the hearing of evidence and simply continued its 
findings until it had a chance to hear Mr. Anderson's testimony. Such a result would have 
preserved fairness in the proceedings and the search for truth without unduly burdening the 
court's busy docket. The trial court, accordingly, acted unreasonably and arbitrarily when it 
failed to allow Koller more time to locate and call Mr. Anderson as a witness. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred when it failed to recognize the 16th section line as the boundary 
between the Koller and Godfrey Section 12 property. Furthermore, substantial evidence does 
not support the trial court's findings that no right-of-way exists along the Section 12 Property 
and that no county road exists along the west edge of the Section 18 Property. For the 
foregoing reasons, the Court should vacate the trial court's findings of fact and remand for a 
new trial. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Koller requests oral argument in order to more fully explain his position and respond to 
questions of the Court regarding factual and legal issues. 
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ir4L DATED this£?£-day of January, 1999. 
M. Byron Fisher / 
Scott M. Petersen 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees the Chase 
Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of January, 1999,1 caused to be mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLEE'S BRIEF to: 
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq. 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
88 West Center 
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RELEVANT 
STATUTES AND 
RULES 
JJ3 TRANSPORTATION 72-5-112 
P A R T I 
PUBLIC HIGHWAYS 
5.101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Rights-of-way Act.* 1998 
^5.102, Definitions. 
\s> used in this part, "state highway purposes" includes: 
(1) rights-of-way, including those necessary for state 
highways within cities and towns; 
(2) the construction, reconstruction, relocation, im-
provement, and maintenance of the state highways and 
other highways, roads, and streets under the control of 
the department; 
(3) limited access facilities, including rights of access, 
air, light, and view and frontage and service roads to 
highways; 
(4) adequate drainage in connection with any highway, 
cut, fill, or channel change and the maintenance of any 
highway, cut, fill, or channel change; 
(5) weighing stations, shops, offices, storage buildings 
and yards, and road maintenance or construction sites; 
(6) road material sites, sites for the manufacture of 
road materials, and access roads to the sites; 
(7) the maintenance of an unobstructed view of any 
portion of a highway to promote the safety of the traveling 
public; 
(8) the placement of traffic signals, directional signs, 
and other signs, fences, curbs, barriers, and obstructions 
for the convenience of the traveling public; 
(9) the construction and maintenance of storm sewers, 
sidewalks, and highway illumination; 
(10) the construction and maintenance of livestock 
highways; and 
(11) the construction and maintenance of roadside rest 
areas adjacent to or near any highway. 1998 
72-5-103. Acquisit ion of rights-of-way and other real 
property — Title to property acquired. 
(1) The department may acquire any real property or inter-
ests in real property necessary for temporary, present, or 
reasonable future state highway purposes by gift, agreement, 
exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise. 
(2) Title to real property acquired by the department or the 
counties, cities, and towns by gift, agreement, exchange, 
purchase, condemnation, or otherwise for highway rights-of-
way or other highway purposes may be in fee simple or any 
lesser estate or interest. 
(3) A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right-of-
way for which the public has only an easement passes the title 
of the person whose estate is transferred to the middle of the 
highway. 1996 
72-5-104. Publ ic use const i tut ing dedication* 
A highway shall be deemed to have* Deehjdedicaied and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continu-
ously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
1996 
72-5-105. Highways once establ ished cont inue until 
abandoned. 
All public highways once established shall continue to be 
highways until abandoned or vacated by order of the highway* 
authorities having jurisdiction over any highway, or by other 
competent authority. 1998 
72-5-106. Expiration of franchise of toll bridge or road. 
If the franchise of any toll bridge or road expires by 
limitation, forfeiture, or nonuser it is a free public highway, 
and no claim shall be valid against the public for right-of-way 
or for land or material comprising the bridge or road. 1998 
72-5-107. United States patents — Patentee and 
county to assert c laims to roads cross ing 
land. 
(1) (a) If any person acquires title from the United States 
to any land in this state over which any public highway 
extends tha t has not been duly platted, and that has not 
been continuously used as a public highway for a period of 
ten years, the person shall within three months after 
receipt of the person's patent assert the person's claim for 
damages in writing to the county executive of the county 
in which the land is situated. 
(b) The county legislative body shall have an additional 
period of three months in which to begin proceedings to 
condemn the land according to law. 
(2) (a) The highway shall continue open as a public high-
way during the periods described under Subsection (1). 
(b) If no action is begun by the county executive within 
the period described under Subsection (1Kb), the highway 
shall be considered to be abandoned by the public. 
(3) In case of a failure by the person so acquiring title to 
public lands to assert his claim for damage during the three 
months from the time the person received a patent to the 
lands, the person shall thereafter be barred from asserting or 
recovering any damages by reason of the public highway, and 
the public highway shall remain open. 1998 
72-5-108. Width of rights-of-way for public h ighways . 
The width of rights-of-way for public highways shall be set 
as the highway authorities of the state, counties, or munici-
palities may determine for the highways under their respec-
tive jurisdiction. 1998 
72-5-109. Contributions of property by count ies and 
municipal i t ies . 
Counties and municipalities may contribute real or personal 
property to the department for state highway purposes. 1998 
72-5-110. Acquis i t ion of personal property. 
The department may acquire by gift, agreement, exchange, 
purchase, or otherwise machinery, tools, equipment, materi-
als, supplies, or other personal property necessary for the 
administration, construction, maintenance, and operation of 
the state highways, and may sell, exchange, or otherwise 
dispose of the machinery, tools, equipment, materials, sup-
plies, and other personal property when no longer suitable or 
required for state highway purposes. 1998 
72-5-111. Disposal of real property. 
(1) (a) If the department determines that any real property 
or interest in real property, acquired for a highway 
purpose, is no longer necessary for the purpose, the 
department may lease, sell, exchange, or otherwise dis-
pose of the real property or interest in the real property. 
(b) Real property may be sold at private or public sale 
and the proceeds of the sale shall be turned over to the 
state treasurer and credited to the Transportation Fund. 
(2) In the disposition of land at any private sale, first 
consideration may be given to the original grantor or his 
successor-in-interest. 
(3) Any sale, exchange, or disposal of real property or 
interest in real property made by the department pursuant to 
this section, is exempt from the mineral reservation provisions 
of Title 65A, Chapter 6, Mineral Leases, and any deed made 
and delivered by the department pursuant to this section 
without specific reservations in the deed is a conveyance of all 
the state's right, title, and interest in the real property or 
interest in the real property. 1998 
72-5-112. Acquis i t ion of real property from county, 
city, or other political subdivis ion — Ex-
change. 
The department may purchase or otherwise acquire from 
any county, city, or other political subdivision of the state real 
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d State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
T of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
ras and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appe^8 firom the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
^rits sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 1996 
78-2a-4. Rev iew of act ions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. 1986 
78-2a-5. Locat ion of Court of Appeals . 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location within the state. 1986 
CHAPTERS 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction—Appeals. 
78-3-5. Repealed. 
78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative System. 
78-3-12. Repealed. 
78-3-12.5. Costs of system. 
78-3-13. Repealed. 
78-3-13.4. Transfer of court operating responsibilities — 
Facilities — Staff — Budget 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. 
78-3-14.2. District court case management. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures. 
Section 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed. 
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to counties. 
78-3-18. Judicial Administration Act — Short title. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
78-3-20. Definitions. 
78-3-21. Judicial Council — Creation — Members — 
Terms and election — Responsibilities — 
Reports. 
78-3-21.5. Data bases for judicial boards. 
78-3-22. Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties. 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Appointment — 
Qualifications — Salary. 
78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, duties, and 
responsibilities. 
78-3-25. Assistants for administrator of the courts — 
Appointment of trial court executives. 
78-3-26. Courts to provide information and statistical 
data to administrator of the courts. 
78-3-27. Annual judicial conference. 
78-3-28. Repealed. 
78-3-29. Presiding judge — Associate presiding judge — 
Election — Term — Compensation — Powers 
— Dutiesr-
78-3-30. Duties of the clerk of the district court. 
78-3-31. Court commissioners — Qualifications — Ap-
pointment — Functions governed by rule. 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 1971, 1981,1988 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office for judges of the district courts is six years, and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. 1988 
78-3-4. Jurisdict ion — Appeals . 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and 
not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary 
writs and other writs necessary to carry into effect their 
orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of law-
yer discipline consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court. 
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters 
properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996. 
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate trials de novo of the judgments of.the justice court and of 
the small claims department of the district court. 
(6) Appeals firom the final orders, judgments, and decrees of 
the district court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review agency 
adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the 
requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency adjudi-
cative proceedings. 
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has 
subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C 
misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances only 
if: 
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction; 
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court 
prior to July 1, 1996; 
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(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record 
holding a statute of the United States or this state 
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in-
volving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction 
of a first degree or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, 
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Ap-
peals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an inter-
locutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3Xa) 
through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or 
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 1996 
78-2-3. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend 
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds ofall members of both houses 
of the Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, 
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. 
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, 
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1988 
78-2-6. Appel late court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
Court. 1986 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7JS. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986,1988 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation — SeaL 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Funct ions — 
Fil ing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to Ihe duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. l*88 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all e%~ 
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary^ 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from forma* 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service^ COTQXD^' 
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fir6 
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Hole 39. Trial by jury or by the court. 
(a) fl? Jury- When trial by jury has been demanded as 
yjded in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the 
gister of actions as a jury action. The trial of all issues so 
demanded shall be by jury, unless 
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written 
tipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made 
.
 0pen court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the 
c0urt sitting without a jury, or 
(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that 
right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not 
exist, or 
(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial. 
(b) fly the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as 
provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwith-
standing the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in 
which such a demand might have been made of right, the court 
in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any 
o r all issues. 
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not 
triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own 
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, with the 
consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose 
verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter 
of right. 
Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance. 
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide 
by rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) 
without request of the parties or (2) upon request of a party 
and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner as 
the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to 
actions entitled thereto by statute. 
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the 
court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be 
just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such post-
ponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence 
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of 
the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that due 
diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also 
require the party seeking the continuance to state, upon 
affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and 
if the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence 
would be given, and that it may be considered as actually 
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the 
trial shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the 
adverse party, the court shall, as a condition to such postpone-
ment, proceed to have the testimony of any witness present 
taken, in the same manner as if at the trial; and the testimony 
so taken may be read on the trial with the same effect, and 
subject to the same objections that may be made with respect 
to a deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(cXl) and (2) 
[Rule 32(cX3XA) and (B)]. 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of 
Rule 66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action may be 
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a 
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse 
party of an answer or other response to the complaint permit-
ted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of 
dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a 
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or 
including the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a 
notice of dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of 
this rule, an action may only be dismissed at the request of the 
plaintiff on order of the court based either on: 
(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in 
the action; or 
(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems 
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant 
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to 
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defen-
dant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending 
for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise 
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is 
without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof For failure of the 
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any 
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action 
or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action 
tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presenta-
tion of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to 
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may 
move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the 
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier 
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment 
until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders 
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall 
make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in 
its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under 
this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this 
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates 
as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary 
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of 
Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction 
of evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who 
has once dismissed an action in any court commences an 
action based upon or including the same claim against the 
same defendant, the court may make such order for the 
payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may 
deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until 
the plaintiff has complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. 
Should a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (aXIXi) 
above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, 
the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional 
remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the 
adverse party against whom such provisional remedy was 
obtained. 
Rule 42. Consolidation; separate trials. 
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common ques-
tion of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a 
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the 
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may 
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend 
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. 
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of convenience 
or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, 
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any 
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separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, 
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues. 
Rule 43. E v i d e n c e . 
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be 
taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these 
rules, the Utah Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this state. All 
evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the Supreme 
Court. 
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts 
not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on 
affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court 
may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral 
testimony or depositions. 
Rule 44. Proof of official r e c o r d . 
(a) Authentication of copy. An official record or an entry 
therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced 
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the 
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, 
and in the absence of judicial knowledge or competent evi-
dence, accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the 
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is within the 
United States or within a territory or insular possession 
subject to the dominion of the United States, the certificate 
may be made by a judge of a court of record of the district or 
political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated 
by the seal of the court, or may be made by any public officer 
having a seal of office and having official duties in the district 
or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenti-
cated by the seal of his office. If the office in which the record 
is kept is in a foreign state or country, the certificate may be 
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, 
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the 
foreign service of the United States stationed in the foreign 
state or country in which the record is kept, and authenticated 
by the seal of his office. 
(b) Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an 
officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy 
that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor 
is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a 
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence tha t 
the records of his office contain no such record or entry. 
(c) Other proof This rule does not prevent the proof of 
official records or of entry or lack of entry therein by any 
method authorized by any applicable statute or by the rules of 
evidence at common law. 
(d) Certified copy of record read in evidence. A copy of any 
official record, or entry therein, in the custody of a public 
officer of this state, or of the United States, certified by the 
officer having custody thereof, to be a full, true and correct 
copy of the original in his custody, may be read in evidence in 
an action or proceeding in the courts of this state, in like 
manner and with like effect as the original could be if 
produced. 
(e) Official record defined. As used in this rule "official 
record" shall mean all public writings, including laws, judicial 
records, all official documents, and public records of private 
writings. 
(f) Proof of the law of another state, territory or foreign 
country. A printed copy of a statute, or other written law of 
another state, or of a territory, or of a foreign country, or a 
printed copy of a proclamation, edict, decree or ordinance by 
the executive power thereof, contained in a book or publication 
purporting or proved to have been published by the authority 
thereof, or proved to be commonly admitted as evidence of the 
existing law of the judicial tribunals thereof, is presumptive 
evidence of the statute, law, proclamation, edict, decree or 
ordinance. The unwritten or common law of another state, or 
of a territory, or of a foreign country, may be proved as a fact 
by oral evidence. The books of reports of cases adjudged in the 
courts thereof must also be admitted as presumptive evidence 
of the unwritten or common law thereof. The law of such state 
or territory or foreign country is to be determined by the court 
or master and included in the findings of the court or master 
or instructions to the jury, as the case may be. Such finding or 
instruction is subject to review. In determining such law, 
neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court shall be limited 
to the evidence produced on the trial by the parties, but may 
consult any of the written authorities above named in this 
subdivision, with the same force and effect as if the same had 
been admitted in evidence. 
Rule 45. Subpoena. 
(a) Form; issuance. 
(1) Every subpoena shall: 
(A) issue from the court in which the action is pending; 
(B) state the title of the action, the name of the court from 
which it is issued, the name and address of the party or 
attorney serving the subpoena, and its civil action number; 
(C) command each person to whom it is directed to appear 
to give testimony at trial, or a t hearing, or at deposition, or to 
produce or to permit inspection and copying of documents or 
tangible things in the possession, custody or control of that 
person, or to permit inspection of premises, at a time and place 
therein specified; and 
(D) set forth the text of Notice to Persons Served with a 
Subpoena, in substantially similar form to Form 30 in the 
Appendix of Forms to these rules. 
(2) A command to produce or to permit inspection and 
copying of documents or tangible things, or to permit inspec-
tion of premises, may be joined with a command to appear at 
trial, or at hearing, or at deposition, or may be issued 
separately. 
(3) The clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed but otherwise 
in blank, to a party requesting it, who shall complete it before 
service. An attorney admitted to practice in the court in which 
the action is pending may also issue and sign a subpoena as an 
officer of the court. 
(b) Service; scope. 
(1) Generally. 
(A) A subpoena may be served by any person who is not a 
party and is not less than 18 years of age. Service of a 
subpoena upon a person named therein shall be made as 
provided in Rule 4(e) for the service of process and, if the 
person's appearance is commanded, by tendering to that 
person the fees for one day's attendance and the mileage 
allowed by law. When the subpoena is issued on behalf of the 
United States, or this state, or any officer or agency of either, 
fees and mileage need not be tendered. Prior notice of any 
commanded production or inspection of documents or tangible 
things or inspection of premises before trial shall be served on 
each party in the manner prescribed by Rule 5(b). 
(B) Proof of service when necessary shall be made by filing 
with the clerk of the court from which the subpoena is issued 
a statement of the date and manner of service and of the 
names of the persons served, certified by the person who made 
the service. 
(C) Service of a subpoena outside of this state, for the 
taking of a deposition or production or inspection of documents 
or tangible things or inspection of premises outside this state, 
shall be made in accordance with the requirements of the 
jurisdiction in which such service is made. 
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(2) Subpoena for appearance at trial or hearing. A subpoena 
commanding a witness to appear at a trial or at a hearing 
pending in this state may be served at any place within the 
state. 
(3) Subpoena for taking deposition. 
(A) A person who resides in this state may be required to 
appear at deposition only in the county where the person 
resides, or is employed, or transacts business in person, or at 
such other place as the court may order. A person who does not 
reside in this state may be required to appear at deposition 
only in the county in this state where the person is served with 
a subpoena, or at such other place as the court may order. 
(B) A subpoena commanding the appearance of a witness at 
a deposition may also command the person to whom it is 
directed to produce or to permit inspection and copying of 
documents or tangible things relating to any of the matters 
within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b), 
but in that event the subpoena will be subject to the provisions 
of Rule 30(b) and paragraph (c) of this rule. 
(4) Subpoena for production or inspection of documents or 
tangible things or inspection of premises. A subpoena to 
command a person who is not a party to produce or to permit 
inspection and copying of documents or tangible things or to 
permit inspection of premises may be served at any time after 
commencement of the action. The scope and procedure shall 
comply with Rule 34, except that the person must be allowed 
at least 14 days to comply as stated in subparagraph (cX2XA) 
of this rule. The party serving the subpoena shall pay the 
reasonable cost of producing or copying the documents or 
tangible things. Upon the request of any other party and the 
payment of reasonable costs, the party serving the subpoena 
shall provide to the requesting party copies of all documents 
obtained in response to the subpoena. 
(c) Protection of persons subject to subpoenas. 
( D A party or an attorney responsible for the issuance and 
service of a subpoena shall take reasonable steps to avoid 
imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to that 
subpoena. The court from which the subpoena was issued 
shall enforce this duty and impose upon the party or attorney 
in breach of this duty an appropriate sanction, which may 
include, but is not limited to, lost earnings and a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(2)(A) A subpoena served upon a person who is not a party 
to produce or to permit inspection and copying of documents or 
tangible things or to permit inspection of premises, whether or 
not joined with a command to appear at trial, or at hearing, or 
at deposition, must allow the person at least 14 days after 
service to comply, unless a shorter time has been ordered by 
the court for good cause shown. 
(B) A person commanded to produce or to permit inspection 
and copying of documents or tangible things or to permit 
inspection of premises need not appear in person at the place 
of production or inspection unless also commanded to appear 
at trial, at hearing, or at deposition. 
(C) A person commanded to produce or to permit inspection 
and copying of documents or tangible things or inspection of 
premises may, before the time specified for compliance with 
the subpoena, serve upon the party or attorney designated in 
the subpoena written objection to inspection or copying of any 
or all of the documents or tangible things or inspection of the 
premises. If objection is made, the party serving the subpoena 
shall not be entitled to inspect and copy the materials or 
inspect the premises except pursuant to an order of the court. 
If objection has been made, the party serving the subpoena 
may, upon notice to the person commanded to produce, move 
at any time for an order to compel the production. Such an 
order to compel production shall protect any person who is not 
a party or an officer of a party from significant expense 
resulting from the inspection and copying commanded. 
(3) (A) On timely motion, the court from which a subpoena 
was issued shall quash or modify the subpoena if it: 
(i) fails to allow reasonable time for compliance; 
(ii) requires a resident of this state who is not a party to 
appear at deposition in a county in which the resident does not 
reside, or is not employed, or does not transact business in 
person; or requires a non-resident of this state to appear at 
deposition in a county other than the county in which the 
person was served; 
(iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected 
matter and no exception or waiver applies; 
(iv) subjects a person to undue burden. 
(B) If a subpoena: 
(i) requires disclosure of-a trade secret or other confidential 
research, development, or commercial information; 
(ii) requires disclosure of an unretained expert's opinion or 
information not describing specific events or occurrences in 
dispute and resulting from the expert's study made not at the 
request of any party; 
(iii) requires a resident of this state who is not a party to 
appear at deposition in a county in which the resident does not 
reside, or is not employed, or does not transact business in 
person; or 
(iv) requires a non-resident of this state who is not a party 
to appear at deposition in a county other than the county in 
which the person was served; 
the court may, to protect a person subject to or affected by 
the subpoena, quash or modify the subpoena or, if the party 
serving the subpoena shows a substantial need for the testi-
mony or material that cannot otherwise be met without undue 
hardship and assures that the person to whom the subpoena is 
addressed will be reasonably compensated, the court may 
order appearance or production only upon specified conditions. 
(d) Duties in responding to subpoena. 
( D A person responding to a subpoena to produce docu-
ments shall produce them as they are kept in the usual course 
of business or shall organize and label them to correspond 
with the categories in the demand. 
(2) When information subject to a subpoena is withheld on 
a claim that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial 
preparation materials, the claim shall be made expressly and 
shall be supported by a description of the nature of the 
documents, communications, or things not produced that is 
sufficient to enable the demanding party to contest the claim. 
(e) Contempt. Failure by any person without adequate 
excuse to obey a subpoena served upon that person may be 
deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena 
issued. An adequate cause for failure to obey exists when a 
subpoena purports to require a nonparty to appear or produce 
at a place not within the limits provided by subparagraph 
<cX3XAXii). 
(f) Procedure where witness conceals himself or fails to 
attend. If a witness evades service of a subpoena, or fails to 
attend after service of a subpoena, the court may issue a 
warrant to the sheriff of the county to arrest the witness and 
bring the witness before the court. 
(g) Procedure when witness is confined in jail. If the witness 
is a prisoner confined in a jail or prison within the state, an 
order for examination in the prison upon deposition or, in the 
discretion of the court, for temporary removal and production 
before the court or officer for the purpose of being orally 
examined, may be made upon motion, with or without notice, 
by a justice of the Supreme Court, or by the district court of 
the county in which the action is pending. 
(h) Subpoena unnecessary; when. A person present in court, 
or before a judicial officer, may be required to testify in the 
same manner as if the person were in attendance upon a 
subpoena. 
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have opportunity to participate A witness so appointed shall 
advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any, the witness' 
deposition may be taken by any party, and the witness may be 
called to testify by the court or any party The witness shall be 
subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party 
calling the witness 
(b) Compensation Expert witnesses so appointed are enti-
tled to reasonable compensation m whatever sum the court 
may allow The compensation thus fixed is payable from funds 
which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil 
actions and proceedings involving just compesation under the 
Fifth Amendment In other civil actions and proceedings the 
compesation shall be paid by the parties m such proportion 
and at such time as the court direct, and thereafter charged in 
like manner as other costs 
(c) Disclosure of appointment In the exercise of its discre-
tion, the court may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact 
that the court appointed the expert witness 
(d) Parties' experts of own selection Nothing in this rule 
limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own 
selection 
ARTICLE VTII. HEARSAY 
Rule 801. Def ini t ions . 
The following definitions apply under this article 
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written asser-
tion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by 
the person as an assertion 
(b) Declarant A "declarant" is a person who makes a 
statement 
(c) Hearsay "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the t ru th of the matter asserted 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay A statement is not 
hearsay if 
(1) Prior statement by witness The declarant testifies at the 
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the 
declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the 
statement or has forgotten or (Bu) consistent with the declar-
ant s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied 
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person 
made after perceiving the person, or 
(2) Admission by party opponent The statement is offered 
against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either 
an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement 
of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its 
t ruth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party 
to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a state-
ment by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter 
within the scope of the agency or employment, made during 
the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a 
coconspirator of a party during the course and m furtherance 
of the conspiracy 
R u l e 802. H e a r s a y rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by 
these rules 
R u l e 803. H e a r s a y excep t ions ; availabil i ty of declarant 
i m m a t e r i a l . 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even 
though the declarant is available as a witness 
(1) Present sense impression A statement describing or 
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was 
perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter 
(2) Excited utterance A statement relating to a startling 
event or condition made while the declarant was under the 
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. 
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, 
emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, 
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but 
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact 
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, 
revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat 
ment Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment and describing medical history, or past or present 
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general 
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as 
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment 
(5) Recorded recollection A memorandum or record con-
cerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge 
but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to 
testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or 
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the 
witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly If 
admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into 
evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless 
offered by an adverse party 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity A memorandum, 
report, record, or data compilation, m any form, of acts, 
events conditions opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the 
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
busmess activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custo-
dian or other qualified witness, unless the source of informa-
tion or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate 
lack of trustworthiness The term "busmess" as used in this 
paragraph mcludes busmess, institution, association, profes-
sion, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not 
conducted for profit 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept m accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph (6) Evidence that a matter is not 
included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compi 
lations, m any form, kept m accordance with the provisions of 
Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of 
the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memoran-
dum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made 
and preserved, unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness 
(8) Public records and reports Records, reports, state-
ments, or data compilations, m any form, of public offices or 
agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, 
or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to 
which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, 
m criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other 
law enforcement personnel, or (C) m civil actions and proceed-
ings and against the Government m criminal cases, factual 
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to 
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or 
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness 
(9) Records of vital statistics Records or data compilations, 
in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the 
report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to require-
ments of law 
(10) Absence of public record or entry Do prove the absence 
of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any 
form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of 
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which a record, report, statement, or data compilation m any 
form, was regularly made and preserved by a pubhc office or 
agency, evidence m the form of a certification in accordance 
^ith Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to 
d^close the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or 
(11) Records of religious organization Statements of births, 
jjjarnages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship 
w blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or 
family history, contained m a regularly kept record of a 
rtfkgious organization 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates State-
ments of fact contained m a certificate that the maker per-
formed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a 
g^crament, made by a clergyman, pubhc official, or other 
person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious 
organization or by law to perform the act certified, and 
piirportmg to have been issued at the time of the act or within 
a reasonable time thereafter 
(13) Family records Statements of fact concerning personal 
0{ family history contained m family Bibles, genealogies, 
charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, 
efigravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property 
Tfie record of a document purporting to establish or affect an 
^e res t in property, as proof of the content of the original 
recorded document and its execution and delivery by each 
person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the 
record is a record of a public office and an applicable statute 
authorizes the recording of documents of that kind m that 
0#ce 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in prop 
efty A statement contained in a document purporting to 
establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated 
^as relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings 
^rith the property since the document was made have been 
^consistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of 
tJie document 
(16) Statements in ancient documents Statements m a 
document in existence twenty years or more the authenticity 
0f which is established 
(17) Market reports commercial publications Market quo-
tations tabulations, lists, directories, or other published com-
pilations, generally used and relied upon by the pubhc or by 
persons in particular occupations 
(18) Learned treatises To the extent called to the attention 
of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by 
t|ie expert witness in direct examination, statements con-
tained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a 
subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established 
ag a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the 
fitness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice If 
admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may 
not be received as exhibits 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history Rep-
utation among members of a person's family by blood, adop-
tion, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the 
community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, 
divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or 
marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family 
history 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history 
Reputation m a community arising before the controversy, as 
to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community, 
and reputation as to events of general history important to the 
community or State or nation in which located 
(21) Reputation as to character Reputation of a person's 
character among associates or in the community 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction Evidence of a final 
judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not 
upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a 
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one 
y^ar, to prove any fact essential to sustam the judgment, but 
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments 
against persons other than the accused The pendency of an 
appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or 
boundaries Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family 
of general history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if 
the same would be provable by evidence of reputation 
(24) Other exceptions A statement not specifically covered 
by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court 
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a 
material fact, (B) the statement is more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (C) the 
general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will 
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence 
However, a statement may not be admitted under this excep-
tion unless the proponent ofTt makes known to the adverse 
p#rty sufficiently m advance of the trial or hearing to provide 
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the 
particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant 
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(a) Definition of unavailability "Unavailability as a wit-
ness" mcludes situations m which the declarant 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of 
privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement, or 
(2) persists m refusing to testify concerning the subject 
matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the 
court to do so, or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement, or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing 
because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or 
infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the 
declarant's statement has been unable to procure the declar-
ant's attendance by process or other reasonable means 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, 
refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to 
the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the declar-
ant's statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from 
attending or testifying 
(b) Hearsay exceptions The following 'are not excluded by 
the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness 
(1) Former testimony Testimony given as a witness at 
another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or m a 
depa&itu&L taken, ux cato$Ua3\c& ^ vth. law ux tha caviies. <iC tlue, 
same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the 
testimony is now offered, or, m a civil action or proceeding, a 
predecessor m interest, had an opportunity and similar motive 
to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examina-
tion 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death In a civil or 
criminal action or proceeding, a statement made by a declar-
ant while believing that the declarant's death was imminent, 
if the judge finds it was made m good faith 
(3) Statement against interest A statement which was at 
the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's 
Tab 3 
TRIAL COURT 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW; 
JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE 
JHOGGAN. P C 
S AT L A W 
l«K*C£NTER 
•: tox 525 
"»N 64323 -0523 
1
 752 J 55 1 
• ^ O N OFFICE 
y S U S T MAIN 
• I C x 1 1 5 
L. Brent Hoggan (#1512) 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
EVAN 0. ROLLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs , 
F. BURKE GODFREY, B. LAMONT 
GODFREY and BURKE'S UTAH LAND 
AND LIVESTOCK, LLC, a Utah 
Limited Liability Company, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 92-118 
This matter came on for trial on the 22nd and 23rd days of 
May, 1997 in the District Courtroom in Logan, Cache County, Utah, 
the Honorable Judge Gordon J. Low presiding. The Plaintiff was 
present in person and was represented by his Attorney, Raymond N. 
Malouf. The Defendants were present in person and were represented 
by their Attorneys, Olson & Hoggan, P.C, L. Brent Hoggan. 
Witnesses were sworn and testified. Glen Thompson, whose 
deposition was taken on February 17, 1993 was not available for 
health reasons to testify at the trial. The deposition of Glen 
Thompson taken February 17, 1993 was published and accepted as 
evidence on motion of Plaintiff and was read by the Trial Judge 
prior to his bench ruling in this case. Documentary evidence was 
presented, the matter was argued by counsel for the Plaintiff and 
the Court having heard the testimony, having read the deposition of 
.Glen Thompson, having examined the physical evidence and having MED - - - ^ ^ . ^ 
14017s-
r^-GQ? 
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heard the arguments of Plaintiff's counsel and being fully advised 
in the premises, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff resides near Cornish, Cache County, Utah. 
2. The Defendants are residents of Clarkston, Cache County, 
Utah. 
3., The property subject of this action is situated in 
Section 12, Township 14 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian (the Section 12 Property) and in Section 18, Township 14 
North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian (the Section 18 
Property). 
4. The Defendant, Burke's Utah Land and Livestock, LLC, is 
the owner of the East Half of the Northeast Quarter and the North 
Half of the Southeast Quarter of the Section 12 Property (the 
Godfrey Section 12 Property). 
5. Plaintiff is the owner of the Southeast Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter of the Section 12 Property (the Roller Section 12 
Property). 
6. On March 29, 1991 the Utah State Water Engineer granted 
an application of Plaintiff to develop a spring situated on the 
Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of the Section 12 
Property (the Spring) . In pursuit of access to the Spring for the 
purpose of developing the same, Plaintiff filed this action to, 
among other things, condemn an easement on the property wherein the 
Spring is situated, and to obtain an order o^ this Court granting 
Plaintiff the right to come upon said property of Godfrey to 
develop the Spring. This Court granted Plaintiff an order of 
occupancy to develop the Spring. Development of the Spring was 
completed in approximately October of 1992. 
7. The area reasonably required to develop the Spring is 900 
feet North and South and 600 feet East and West (the Spring Area) 
and is particularly described as follows: 
3 
Beginning 595 feet West of the railroad post located at 
the Section 12 16th corner point on the East side of the 
adjoining Roller and Godfrey properties in Section 12, 
Township 14 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
thence North 900 feet, thence West 600 feet, thence South 
900 feet, thence East 600 feet along the Koller/Godfrey 
Section 12 boundary to beginning. 
8. The use to which the Spring Area is to be applied by 
Plaintiff is a use authorized by law. 
9. The taking of an easement on the Spring Area by Plaintiff 
is necessary to Plaintiff's development, use and maintenance of the 
Spring. 
10. The construction of the collection and piping system used 
to develop the Spring in the Spring Area commenced and was 
completed by Plaintiff within a reasonable time after Plaintiff 
initiated this action. 
11. The Spring has not been applied to any public use other 
than Plaintiff's use. 
12. Plaintiff does not require the fee simple title to the 
Spring Area in order to develop the Spring or to beneficially use 
the water from the Spring but rather requires only an easement on 
the Spring Area for such development, use and maintenance upon the 
payment of damages for any injury to the surface of the Spring Area 
resulting from the installation and maintenance of the 
paraphernalia installed to develop the Spring and to transfer water 
from the Spring across the property of Defendant. Defendant should 
retain the surface rights to the Spring Area. The easement for 
Plaintiff to use the Spring Area to develop the Spring should 
expire in the event the Plaintiff fails to make the necessary proof 
to the Utah State Water Engineer to perfect the water rights 
granted to Plaintiff in the Spring or in the event Plaintiff's 
water rights in the Spring are perfected and thereafter lost by the 
Plaintiff or his successors in ownership for any reason. 
13. Defendants have waived compensation for surface damage to 
the Spring Area caused by Plaintiff in his development of the 
Spring. Such waiver does not include the waiver of any damage to 
4 
the surface of the Spring Area which may be caused by Plaintiff or 
his successors hereafter. 
14 . The air relief valve installed by Plaintiff on the Spring 
Area in connection with Plaintiff's development of the Spring 
unnecessarily injures Defendants and should and can be removed from 
Godfrey's Section 12 Property. 
15. Shirleen T. Clark, Beth T. Williams, Venna T. Godfrey and 
Glen Norman Thompson are the owners of the Southwest Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter of the Section 12 Property (the Clark Property). 
Shirleen T. Clark, Beth T. Williams, Venna T. Godfrey and Glen 
Norman Thompson are the children of Glen Thompson who owned the 
Clark Section 12 Property prior to Shirleen T. Clark, Beth T. 
Williams, Venna T. Godfrey and Glen Norman Thompson. 
16. Roller acquired title to the Roller Section 12 Property 
and the Roller Section 18 Property by a Warranty Deed from Lillie 
B. Thompson, a copy of which was introduced and received into 
evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 101 (the Thompson-Roller Deed). 
The Thompson-Roller Deed makes no reference to easements or rights 
of way. 
17. Lillie B. Thompson acquired title to the Roller Section 
12 and Section 18 Property by a Decree of Distribution in the 
Matter of the Estate of Wendell Thompson, the husband of Lillie B. 
Thompson. A copy of the Decree of Distribution in the Matter of 
the Estate of Wendell Thompson was introduced and received into 
evidence as Defendant's Exhibit No. 20 (the Wendell Thompson 
Decree). The Wendell Thompson Decree makes no mention of or 
reference to any easement or right-of-way. 
18. Wendell Thompson acquired title to the Roller Section 12 
and Section 18 Property by Warranty Deed from Renneth Thompson and 
Peru Thompson, a copy of which was introduced and received into 
evidence as Defendant's Exhibit No. 21 (the Renneth 
Thompson/Wendell Thompson Deed). 
19. The Renneth Thompson/Wendell Thompson Deed provides on 
its face that: 
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 It is the intent of this conveyance also to convey to 
the Grantee all of the right which the Grantors have or 
claim in and to a certain spring, its pipeline, all 
rights-of-way used in connection therewith, together with 
all rights used in connection with said spring, also to 
convey to the Grantee all of the right, title and 
interest of Grantors to a steel watering trough used to 
collect said water and to facilitate its use, said 
watering trough being situated in the Northwest Corner of 
the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of said 
Section 12." 
20. The Kenneth Thompson/Wendell Thompson Deed makes no 
reference to an easement for ingress and egress across the Godfrey 
Property and Plaintiff produced no evidence at trial to indicate 
that the rights-of-way referred to in the Kenneth Thompson/Wendell 
Thompson Deed referred to Plaintiff's claimed easement for ingress 
and egress across the Godfrey Section 12 Property. 
21. A copy of a Quit Claim Deed from Kenneth Thompson and 
Peru Thompson, his wife, to Glen W. Thompson was introduced into 
evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 13. Said Quit Claim Deed 
conveys: 
"The right to water livestock consisting principally 
of work animals at a steel watering trough situated in 
the Northwest Corner of the Southeast Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 12, Township 14 North, Range 
2 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; together with 
the right of ingress and egress to said steel watering 
trough for the purpose of carrying the right hereby 
conveyed into effect. It being understood and agreed 
that this right is not exclusive, but is to be exercised 
in connection with similar rights of other parties and 
subject to reasonable care to avoid unnecessary 
interference with the rights of other parties to a like 
service." 
This Quit Claim Deed makes no reference to an easement for ingress 
and egress across the Godfrey Section 12 Property and no evidence 
was presented by Plaintiff to show that the rights conveyed thereby 
made any reference to Plaintiffs' claimed easement for ingress and 
egress across the Godfrey Section 12 Property. 
22. For more than eighty (80) years last past there has been 
a marker at Point C on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 in the form of a 
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railroad tie imbedded vertically in the ground approximately three 
feet (3') and protruding from the ground approximately five feet 
(5'). This railroad tie marks the Northeast Corner of the Roller 
Section 12 Property and the Southeast Corner of the Godfrey Section 
12 Property. 
23. At Point B on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1, there 
historically existed a steel watering trough which is shown on 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No.'s 229, 230, 231 and 233 (the trough) in 
such a way so as to enable horses owned by Godfrey's predecessor's 
in interest to water therefrom, for horses owned by Roller's 
predecessor's in interest to water therefrom and for horses owned 
by Clark's predecessor's in interest to water therefrom. 
24. The trough was situated in the Northwest Corner of the 
Roller Section 12 Property, the Northeast Corner of the Clark 
Property and on the Godfrey Section 12 Property. 
25. There is a square pipe imbedded in the ground at 
approximately Point A on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1. This square 
pipe replaced a wooden post in the exact same location and the post 
and pipe in succession have been in the present location of the 
square pipe for more than eight (80) years last past. 
26. The square pipe at Point A on Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 
marks the recognized boundary between the Northwest Corner of the 
Clark Property and the Southwest Corner of the Godfrey Section 12 
Property. 
27. There historically existed a fence from Point A through 
Point B to Point C on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1. Said fence 
existed from more than eighty (80) years ago up to the time when it 
was gradually and piece by piece removed by the owners of the 
property on either side thereof. Said fence will be hereinafter 
referred to as the ABC Fence. 
28. The ABC Fence extended over approximately the middle 
going North and South of the trough at a point on the South side of 
the old grain drill on the East and North side of the trough as 
shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit No.'s 229, 230, 231 and 233. 
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29. Rollers and Clarks and their respective predecessors in 
ownership and interest of the Clark and Roller Properties 
cultivated up to the ABC Fence on the North and Godfreys and their 
predecessor in interest cultivated up to the ABC Fence on the South 
of the Godfrey Property and Godfreys and their predecessors in 
interest and Rollers and Clarks and their predecessors in interest 
recognized and treated the ABC Fence as the boundary line between 
their respective properties from more than eighty (80) years ago 
until the dispute giving rise to this action came about. 
30. The Court finds that the ABC Fence line marks the 
historical and recognized boundary between the Godfrey Section 12 
Property on the North and the Roller Section 12 and Clark Property 
on the South. 
31. The legal description ABC Fence line was established by 
a survey made by Hansen and Associates, Inc. on April 20, 1995 
which survey was introduced and received into evidence as 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 2. The ABC Fence line is legally described 
as follows: 
Fence Line 
A line projected through two fence post, a rail road tie 
post at the East end and a square pipe at the West end, 
shown to us in the field by Burke Godfrey. Said line 
described as follows: 
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Beginning at a point located North 00°10'32n East along 
the center of Section line as currently monumented 
1300.82 feet from the aluminum cap monument found at the 
South Quarter Corner of Section 12, Township 14 North, 
Range 2 West, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and 
running thence North 89°37'37n East through two fence 
post 2660.11 feet to the East line of said Section. 
32. In addition, the Court finds that Defendant, F. Burke 
Godfrey, the Plaintiff, Randy Bott (Bott) a Utah licensed surveyor 
and his assistant Don Williams (Williams), met on the Section 12 
Property "eight (8) or nine (9) years ago" and prior to December 
26, 1989; that Bott, Plaintiff and F. Burke Godfrey met at the 
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Exhibit No. 1 and there, with a surveying instrument belonging to 
and provided by Bott, sited a line from said railroad tie straight 
to the square pipe located at Point A on the ABC Fence line where 
Williams was holding a siting stick and that Plaintiff and F. Burke 
Godfrey then and there agreed that the ABC Fence line as cited by 
Bott and observed by Plaintiff and F. Burke Godfrey would be the 
boundary line between Godfrey's Section 12 Property and Roller's 
Section 12 Property. Glen 6oafircy,Jwho was the owner of the Clark 
Property at the time his deposition was taken on February 17, 1993, 
stated in his deposition that the A and B line on Defendants' 
Exhibit No. 1 was the boundary line between the Clark Property on 
the South and the Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of the 
Section 12 Property on the North. 
ij 33. The Court finds that the agreement referred to in Finding 
. No. 32 above is cumulative to the establishment of the ABC Fence 
jl 
M line as the boundary between the Godfrey Section 12 Property on the 
I ji North and the Roller Section 12 and Clark Properties on the South 
(| and that the evidence conclusively established the ABC Fence line 
i as such boundary line independent of the agreement made by Godfrey 
and Roller at the meeting referred to in Finding of Fact No. 32. 
34. The steel post with flags attached to them shown on 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 229, 230, 231, 232, and 233 and the telephone 
pole shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit 235 are not on the ABC Fence 
line, were not placed as shown on said Exhibits in the presence of 
any of the Defendants and do not mark or define the location of the 
ABC Fence line. 
35. The boundaries established by the ABC Fence line on 
, Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 between the Godfrey Section 12 Property 
• and the property of Plaintiff in Section 7, Township 14 North, 
-i Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, should be marked by telephone 
poles to be set by the Defendants at the following points: 
A. Immediately South of the Northeast corner of 
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B. 
Point C 
situated. 
C. 
At the exact point where the railroad tie at 
on Defendants' Exhibit No. 2 is presently 
At some points between the telephone poles 
provided in A. and B. above so that the boundary line 
between those two (2) telephone poles can be sited from 
pole to pole. 
D. Adjoining on the North of the square pipe at 
Point A on Defendants' Exhibit No. 2. 
E. Somewhere along the ABC Fence line at 
Defendants' election. 
36. Defendants should be allowed to use the telephone pole 
belonging to Plaintiff and situated at approximately Point B on 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 as one of the telephone poles to be set 
pursuant to Finding No. 35. 
37. Roller has claimed a prescriptive easement or right-of-
way by prescription or otherwise over the Godfrey Section 12 
Property immediately North of the ABC Fence line. 
38. Roller has failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence or at all the existence of such claimed prescriptive 
easement and the Court finds that Roller has no prescriptive or 
other kind of easement across the Godfrey Section 12 Property. 
39. Prior to the time that Roller acquired the Wendell 
Thompson Property in Section 18 Property, there was evidence of 
travel along the West boundary of the Godfrey Section 18 Property 
between Points G and E shown on Defendants' Exhibit 1. 
40. Roller acquired the Roller Section 18 Property in 1967. 
41. Godfrey's predecessor in ownership of the Godfrey Section 
18 Property was Don Anderson (Anderson). 
42. Within two (2) years after Roller acquired the Roller 
Section 18 Property, Anderson began cultivating up to the West line 
of the Godfrey Section 18 Property and obliterated any evidence of 
travel across the West boundary of the Godfrey Section 18 Property 
and has cultivated up to that line continuously every year until 
Godfrey acquired the property from Anderson and Godfrey has 
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cultivated up to the West line of the Godfrey Section 18 Property 
each and every year since Godfrey acquired the Godfrey Section is 
Property up to the present time. 
43. Roller has produced no evidence to establish the basis on 
which evidence of travel along the West portion of the Godfrey 
Section 18 Property occurred or was used prior to the time Roller 
acquired his Section 18 Property. There is no evidence before the 
Court that there was any deeded, prescriptive or Cache County right 
to any easement along the G-F line on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 
11 across the Godfrey Section 18 Property prior to the time that 
I! Roller acquired Roller's Section 18 Property. 
n 
11 44. Roller has failed to establish by preponderance of the 
I evidence or at all that he or those acting under him have 
!| established a prescriptive easement by continuous open and adverse 
.'use under a claim of right for the prescriptive period over the 
J western portion of Godfrey's Section 18 Property between Points F 
;i and G on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1. 
i 45. There are common boundaries between the Roller Section 12 
'! Property and the Godfrey Section 12 Property and between the 
Godfrey Section 12 Property and property owned by Roller in Section 
, 7, Township 14 North, Range 1 West. These boundaries are shown by 
a blue marker on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1. In addition, there is 
a common boundary between the Roller Section 18 Property and the 
;' Godfrey Section 18 Property as marked in blue on Defendants' 
Exhibit No. 1 and between other Roller property and property not 
owned but being operated by Godfrey. 
,| 46. Roller has encroached upon various properties owned 
!
, and/or being operated by Godfrey with chemical spray which has 
damaged crops owned by Godfrey. 
47. Godfreys have waived their claims of damages prior to the 
trial of this case for such encroachment and crop destruction. 
««7521551
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49. Defendants have not defended Plaintiff's claim nor 
pursued any of their claims herein in bad faith. 
50. Plaintiff is not entitled to any damages against 
Defendants or any of them. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A decree should enter granting Plaintiff an easement on 
the Spring Area as described in Findings of Fact No. 7, for the 
purpose of developing and maintaining the drains, collection 
facilities and water lines installed by Plaintiff in connection 
with the development of the Spring. 
2. A decree should enter that Defendants have and retain the 
surface rights to the Spring Area. 
3. A decree should enter that the easement granted by the 
Court to develop the Spring will expire in the event Plaintiff 
fails to make the necessary proof to the Utah State Water Engineer 
to perfect the water rights granted to the Plaintiff in the Spring 
or in the event Plaintiff's water rights in the Spring are 
perfected and thereafter lost by the Plaintiff or his successor in 
ownership for any reason. 
4. Based upon Defendants' waiver of compensation for surface 
damage to the Spring Area by Plaintiff while installing a 
collection system and line to convey water from the Spring to the 
Property of Plaintiff, a decree should enter that Defendants 
receive no damage for Plaintiff's prior actions in development of 
the Spring Area. 
5. A decree should enter that Defendants' waiver of damages 
to the surface of the Spring Area during and as a result of 
Plaintiff's development of the Spring in the year 1992 does not 
waive any damage which may be caused by Plaintiff or his successors 
hereafter and that Defendants and their successors shall have the 
12 
right to be compensated for any damages resulting to the surface of 
the Spring Area as a result of the acts by Plaintiff, his 
successors and/or those acting under Plaintiff or his successors 
hereafter. 
6. A decree should enter ordering Plaintiff to remove the 
air relief valve from the Defendants' property. 
7. A decree should enter that the ABC Fence line 
particularly described by meets and bounds in paragraph 31 of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact is the boundary line between the Godfrey 
Section 12 Property on the North and the Roller Section 12 
Properties and the Clark Property on the South. 
8. A decree should enter requiring Defendants to mark the 
boundaries between the Godfrey Section 12 Property and the property 
M of Plaintiff in Section 7, Township 14 North, Range 1 West, Salt 
i| Lake Meridian, as provided in paragraph 35 of the foregoing 
J Findings of Fact. 
!l 9. A decree should enter that Plaintiff has no easement 
'| either by prescriptive use or deed over the Godfrey Section 12 
!j Property. 
!; 10. A decree should enter permanently enjoining and 
•; restraining Roller and any claiming by, under or through him from 
! traveling by any means across the Godfrey Section 12 Property other 
• than for the purposes of developing and maintaining improvements in 
,[ connection with Plaintiff's development of the Spring and then 
j limited specifically to the Spring Area. 
!| 11. A decree should enter that Roller has no easement by deed 
or prescription across the Godfrey Section 18 Property. 
j| 12. A decree should enter permanently in restraining and 
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14. A decree should enter that Defendants defense of 
Plaintiff's claim or pursuit of any of their claims herein were not 
taken or maintained in bad faith. 
15. A decree should enter that the Plaintiff is not entitled 
to any damage against Defendants or either of them. 
Let judgment enter accordingly. 
DATED this 1 4- day of July, 1997. 
v '--r?^ 
LBH/ct v- • •-,
 L 
godfrey fc fv V ' ? ^ 
N-4894 "- c' " ' ' ' 
Hon J"./Low 
istrict Court Judge 
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L. Brent Hoggan (#1512) 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
56 West Center 
P. 0. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
Telephone (801) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
EVAN O. ROLLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
F. BURKE GODFREY, B. LAMONT 
GODFREY and BURKE'S UTAH LAND 
AND LIVESTOCK, LLC, a Utah 
Limited Liability Company, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Civil No. 92-118 
This matter came on for trial on the 22nd and 23rd days of 
May, 1997 in the District Courtroom in Logan, Cache County, Utah, 
the Honorable Judge Gordon J. Low presiding. The Plaintiff was 
present in person and was represented by his Attorney, Raymond N. 
Malouf. The Defendants were present in person and were represented 
by their Attorneys, Olson & Hoggan, P . C , L. Brent Hoggan. 
Witnesses were sworn and testified. Glen Thompson, whose 
deposition was taken on February 17, 1993 was not available for 
health reasons to testify at the trial. The deposition of Glen 
Thompson taken February 17, 1993 was published and accepted as 
evidence on motion of Plaintiff and was read by the Trial Judge 
prior to his bench ruling in this case. Documentary evidence was 
presented, the matter was argued by counsel for the Plaintiff and 
the Court having heard the testimony, having read the deposition of 
Glen Thompson, having examined the physical;- evidence and having 
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heard the arguments of Plaintiff's counsel, and being fully advised 
in the premises, and the Court having heretofore made and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters 
the following: 
JUDGMENT AflD DECREE 
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It is hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff be and is hereby granted an easement on 
the Spring Area described as follows: 
Beginning 595 feet West of the railroad post located at 
the Section 12 16th corner point on the East side of the 
adjoining Roller and Godfrey properties in Section 12, 
Township 14 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
thence North 900 feet, thence West 600 feet, thence South 
900 feet, thence East 600 feet along the Roller/Godfrey 
Section 12 boundary to beginning. 
for the purpose of developing the drains, collection facilities and 
water lines installed by Plaintiff in connection with development 
[I of said Spring on said Spring Area. 
ij 2. That Defendants shall have and retain the surface rights 
ij to the Spring Area shown on Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
| 3. The easement granted to Plaintiff pursuant to paragraph 
i; 1 above will expire in the event Plaintiff fails to make the 
, necessary proof to the Utah State Water Engineer to perfect the 
j water rights granted to the Plaintiff in the Spring on the 
I j Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 12, Township 
i| 2 West, Range 14 North, Salt Lak$ Base and Meridian, or in the 
I. event Plaintiff's water rights in said Spring are perfected and 
|5, thereafter lost by the Plaintiff or his successor in ownership for 
,| any reason. 
4. Based upon Defendant's waiver of compensation for surface 
,' damage to the Spring Area by Plaintiff while installing a 
collecting system and line to convey water from said Spring to the 
,' Property of Plaintiff, it is ordered that Defendants receive no 
|, damage prior to the date of this Decree for Plaintiff's development 
'' of the Spring in said Spring Area. 
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5. The prohibition provided in paragraph 4 hereof shall not 
constitute a waiver of Defendants' right to damages to the surface 
of said Spring Area hereafter and that Defendants and their 
successors in interest shall have the right to be compensated for 
any damages resulting to the surface of said Spring Area as a 
result of the acts of Plaintiff or his successors and those acting 
under the Plaintiff or his successors hereafter. 
6. Plaintiff is ordered to forthwith remove the air relief 
valve installed by him on Defendants' property in the Northeast 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 12, Township 2 West, 
Range 14 North, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
7. The following described line: 
Fence Line 
A line projected through two fence post, a rail road tie 
post at the East end and a square pipe at the West end, 
shown to us in the field by Burke Godfrey. Said line 
described as follows: 
Beginning at a point located North 00°10'32n East along 
the center of Section line as currently monumented 
1300.82 feet from the aluminum cap monument found at the 
South Quarter Corner of Section 12, Township 14 North, 
Range 2 West, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and 
running thence North 89°37'37" East through two fence 
post 2660.11 feet to the East line of said Section. 
shall be and is hereby fixed as the boundary line between the North 
Half of the Southeast Quarter of Section 12, Township 2 West, Range 
14 North, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and the North line of the 
South Half of the Northeast Quarter of Section 12, Township 2 West, 
Range 14 North, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
8. Defendants are ordered to mark the boundary lines 
established pursuant to paragraph 7 above by telephone poles 
installed as follows: 
A. At the West terminus of said division line. 
B. At the East end of said division line. 
C. At such locations along said division line as 
Defendants may elect. 
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In addition, Defendants are ordered to mark the boundary line 
between property belonging to Burke's Utah Land and Livestock, LLC 
in Section 12, Township 2 West, Range 14 North, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian and the property of Plaintiff in Section 7, Township 1 
West, Range 14, Salt Lake Base and Meridian by telephone poles 
installed as follows: 
D. Immediately South of the Northeast corner of Section 
12, Township 14 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
E. At some point between the telephone poles provided 
in paragraph 8.B. and D. above so that the boundary line 
between those two (2) telephone poles can be sited from point 
to point. 
9. That Defendants be and are allowed to use the telephone 
pole situated at approximately Point B on Defendants' Exhibit No. 
1 and shown on Plaintiff's Exhibits 235 and 237 as one of the poles 
to be set pursuant to subparagraphs A. and B. of paragraph 8 of 
this Judgment and Decree. 
10. That Plaintiff and those claiming by, under or through 
Plaintiff have no prescriptive easement across property belonging 
to the Defendants in Section 12, Township 14 North, Range 2 West of 
the Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
11. That Plaintiff and those claiming by, under or through 
Plaintiff are hereby perpetually and permanently enjoined and 
restrained from traveling by any means across the property of 
Defendants in Section 12 other than for the purpose of developing 
and maintaining improvements on the Spring Area as defined in this 
Judgment and Decree and then only upon said Spring Area. 
12. That Plaintiff has no easement by deed or prescription 
across the following described property belonging to Burke's Utah 
Land and Livestock, LLC: 
The Southwest Quarter and the Northwest Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 18, Township 14 North, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. (The Godfrey 
Section 18 Property). 
13. Plaintiff and all claiming by, under and through 
Plaintiff are perpetually and permanently enjoined and restrained 
from coming upon and/or traveling by any means across the Godfrey 
Section 18 Property. 
14. Each of the Plaintiff and the Defendants are enjoined and 
restrained from encroaching on the properties owned or being 
l| operated by the other by spraying, physical trespassing, or any 
other means whatever. 
15. Defendants defense of Plaintiff's claims and pursuit of 
Defendants' claims herein were not taken, initiated or maintained 
in bad faith. 
16. That Plaintiff is not entitled to any damages against 
Defendants or either of them. 
DATED this Jj-Uday of July, 1997. 
v 
"Gordon*" J. Low 
District Court Judge 
~ ' - ~ ; T ^ . . 
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